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IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
RENNOLD PENDER, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
R. L. BIRD and MAE C. BIRD, his 
wife, et al. 
Defendants and Respondents, 
Case No. 7344 
Brief of Appellant 
I. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
A-PLAINTIFF'S APPEAL 
This appeal arises through a suit instituted by plaintiff 
and appellant in the district court of Salt Lake County, Utah 
for the quieting of title to certain real property situated on 
South Main Street, in Salt Lake City, Utah, in which action 
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plaintiff and appellant named as defendants, R. L. Bird 
and Mae C. Bird, his wife, who claim title to said property 
by virtue of a County tax deed ( Tr. 2) and also by virtue 
oi a deed from Salt Lake City Corporation issued by virtue 
of a sale of the property for special assessments, (Tr. 5). 
The property has a 50 foot frontage on Main Street and is 
situated near the corner of Seventh South Street and is 80 
feet in depth. 
Plaintiff and appellant named Frank B. Bowers and 
Winifred S. Bowers, his wife, as parties defendant in 
addition to respondents. Frank B. Bowers and wife ans-
wered plaintiff's complaint denying the allegation of owner-
ship in plaintiff and claiming fee simple title to the property 
described in the complaint in themselves ( Rec. 59 to 61 
incl.). Attention is directed to the fact that these defendants 
appeared on their own behalf and not on behalf of Bowers 
Investment Company, a corporation, which corporation was 
the record owner of the property in 1928 through which 
plaintiff and appellant claims title in fee. 
Defendants Frank B. Bowers and Winifred S. Bowers 
have since the conclusion of the trial of said cause and 
since the entry of judgment by the trial court, disclaimed all 
right, title and interest in and to the premises described in 
appellant's complaint, together with any and all rights they 
or either of them have under their affirmative defense or 
counterclaim as against either the appellant or respondents 
Birds (Rec. 106), therefore this appeal is not being prose-
cuted as against defendants Bowers. 
The property affected by this action is now and has been 
at all times unimproved vacant property and not enclosed 
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with a fence t Tr. 53), which condition existed until tax title to 
same was acquired by defendants and respondents Bird in 
1945 when respondents caused an advertising sign or bill 
board to be placed upon said property and at which time 
plaintiff and appellant placed a tenant in possession who 
operated a used car lot thereon, (Tr. 53 and 54). Thus 
both appellant and respondents claimed actual possession of 
the property from 1945 to the date of trial of said cause, 
each making use of the property subsequent to the year 1945. 
Fee simple title to the property vested in Bowers Invest-
ment Company, a corporation of Utah, in 1928 (Tr. 2) 
which corporation was in 1928 and has been at all times 
thereafter, a corporation in good standing (Tr. 57). Bowers 
Investment Company, a corporation was not made a party to 
the action either by the original complaint filed by plaintiff 
and appellant, by the answers and counterclaims of defend-
ants and respondents, nor by the complaint in intervention 
filed by Frank B. Bowers and his wife or the answer and 
affirmative defense set up in the answer filed by said Frank 
B. Bowers and wife. Neither did Bowers Investment Com-
pany intervene in the action. 
B-CHAIN OF TITLE 
The abstract of title offered by plaintiff and appellant 
and received in evidence at the trial as plaintiff's Exhibit 
"A", being a supplemental abstract of title from date of 
Feb. 14th, 1928 at 4:22 p. m. shows the chain of title to 
said property as follows, it having been agreed that fee 
simple title in 1928 was vested in Bowers Investment Com-
pany, a corporation, the deed to said corporation is not 
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contained in the abstract, however all instruments affecting 
the title to said property thereafter are as follows: 
Entry No. !-Certificate of sale for Special taxes to 
Salt 'Lake City Corporation, dated Apr. 
20, 1928 for sidewalk extension No. 217, 
consideration being $87.01. -
Entry No. 2-Certificate of sale for Special taxes to 
Salt Lake City Corporation, dated Apr. 
20, 1928 for Sidewalk extension No. 217, 
consideration being $65.46. 
Entry No. 3-Tax Sale, from Salt Lake County Treas-
urer to Salt Lake County, dated Dec. 21, 
1928, consideration being $26.53, to 
which sale taxes for the following years 
in the following amounts were added: 
1929-$33.82 
1930-$24.35 
1931-$24.45 
1932-$28.35 
1933-$31.96 
1934--$32.63 
Entry No. 4--Certificate of sale for special taxes to 
Salt Lake City Corporation~ dated Sept. 
16, 1935, for paving ext. No. 208, con-
sideration being $1126.68. 
Entry No. 5-Auditor's· Tax Deed issued to Salt Lake 
County, to carry into effect the tax sale 
dated Dec. 21. 1928 ( entrv No. 3 above), 
dated Mar. 13, 1936, for a considera-
tion of S25.27. 
Entrv No. 6--Recorder'~ DPed issued to s~ lt LRkP· Citv, 
a muhicina] ~ornoration for ~1rlPwA lk 
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extenswn 1~0. ~1 ', \ entne:; 1 and ~ 
aoove) oeanng d.ate 01 J.Jec. ~1, l Y.Jo, 
cons1aeratwn oemg .:n;ots~<±.14 covenng 
tile property attected and also other 
property. 
Entry ~o. 7-QUit C1a1m Deed from Bowers invest-
ment Co., grantor to V. Lynn Hansen, 
grantee, bearing date Oct. 6, 193 7, re-
corded .Feb. 14, 1938, consideration re-
cited $10.00 etc. /. R. Stamp $.50 
Entry l\o. 8-Recorder's Deed issued to Salt Lake City, 
a Municipal corporation for paving ex-
tension No. 208 (entry No. 4 above) 
bearing date Jan. 26, 1940, considera-
tion being $35,714.16 covering the prop-
erty affected and also other property. 
Entry No. 9-Deed of Salt Lake County, toR. L. Bird, 
(respondent) grantee, bearing date Sept. 
5, 1945, the consideration recited being 
$350.00. 
Entry No. 10-Quit Claim Deed from V. Lynn Hansen 
and Milia Hansen, his wife, grantors, to 
Rennold Pender (appellant) hearing 
date of Aug. 14th, 1945, the considera-
tion recited being $10.00 and other good 
and valuable cons. 
Entry No. 11-Recorder's Deed issued to Salt Lake 
City, a Municipal Corporation for pav-
ing extension No. 208 (entry No. 4 
above) bearing date of Jan. 3, 1946, 
consideration being $1126.68, this deed 
covers only the property affected and 
no other property. 
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Entry No. 12-Quit Claim Deed from V. Lynn Hansen 
and Milia A. Hansen, his wife, grantors 
to Frank B. Bowers, grantee, bearing 
date Jan. 25, 1938, the consideration 
recited being $1.00, etc. I. R. Stamp 
$.50. (This deed was not recorded until 
Jan. 17, 1946) 
Entry No. 13-Quit Claim Deed from Salt Lake City, 
a Municipal corporation, grantor, to ~­
L. Bird, grantee, bearing date Feb. 26, 
1946, the consideration recited being 
$910.00 which deed covers the property 
affected and other property. 
C-RESPONDENTS' TITLE DEFECTS 
The county tax deed shown at entry No. 5 of the abstract 
is defective in that there was no Auditor's Affidavit attached 
to the assessment rolls for the year 1928, the year for which 
the property was sold for taxes (Tr. 5), this being one of the 
deeds upon which respondents rely for their title to the prop-
erty. The other source of title on which respondents rely for 
their title is the Recorder's Deeds covering the special assess-
ments levied by Salt Lake City Corporation. 
Defendants and respondents introduced no evidence at 
the trial showing title passing to Salt Lake City Corporation 
by virtue of delinquent special assessments (Tr. 66), nor did 
respondents prove the regularity of the proceedings leading 
up to the sale of the property for special assessments (Tr. 
66). 
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D-STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS 
Respondents contended at the trial of the case that even 
if the county tax deed was defective, respondents were en-
titled to prevail under the statutes of limitation which were 
pleaded by defendants and respondents as an affirmative de-
fense and counterclaim to plaintiff's complaint. (Tr. 7). 
As to respondents' contention it is pointed out that the 
action from which this appeal is taken was filed by appellant 
on October 14th, 194 7, that it is the second action filed by 
appellant for the quieting of title to the property affected, and 
against respondents. The, first action was filed by plaintiff 
and appellant on May 9th, 1947 in which action defendants 
and respondents Birds were named parties defendants with 
other defendants, and in said complaint appellant named also 
all other persons unknown claiming any right, title, estate 
or interest in or lein upon the real property described in the 
complaint adverse to plaintiff's ownership or clouding plain-
tiff's title thereto, as parties defendant. This first action did 
not include Frank B. Bowers and Winnifred S. Bowers, his 
wife, as parties defendants however. 
As has heretofore been said, the first action herein re-
ferred to was filed in the office of the County Clerk of Salt 
Lake ·County, Utah, by plaintiff on May 9th, 1947, which 
was four days before the effective date of Sec. 104-2-5.10, 
Laws of Utah, 1947. The first action was dismissed without 
having been tried on its merits ( Rec. 39). This allegation 
contained in plaintiff's complaint was admitted by defendants' 
Birds by their answer, paraghaph 2 (Rec. 43). However, at 
the trial of the case, respondents urged that plaintiff and 
appellant was not saved by Sec. 104-2-41 U.C.A. 1943 he-
cause of the fact that plaintiff and appellant brought Frank 
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B. Bowers and his wife into the second action, and that they 
were not made parties to the first action, although it was the 
same property involved in the action and respondents Bird 
were named parties defendant in both actions. Even if such 
contention were sound, and we think it is not, respondents 
waved such objection through their admission in their answer. 
Defendants and Respondents also rely upon the statutes 
of limitation as a bar to appellant's action, having pleaded 
by tlieir answer and counterclaim as a bar, Sec. 104-2-5, 
104-2-5.10 UCA as added by Ch. 18 ~nd 19, Laws of Utah, 
1943 as amended and Sec. 104-2-6 UCA 1943 as amended 
by Laws of Utah, 1943 Ch. 20, ( Rec. 43 and 45). Plaintiff 
and appellant also relies on the statute of limitation, Sec. 
104-2-5, 104-2-6, 104-2-12 UCA 1943 and on Sec. 104-2-5.10 
Laws of Utah, 1947, all of which appellant pleaded as a bar 
to respondents' action and counterclaim, and denied by his 
reply that his action was barred by the statute of limitation. 
E-TRIAL PROCEEDINGS AND THE EVIDENCE 
Both plaintiff and defendants and responden~s Bird filed 
their motions for judgment on the pleadings in said cause 
(Rec. 57) and (Rec. 63) each of which motions were argued 
ora,lly before Honorable Roald A. Hogenson, and by the filing 
of written briefs by each of ~aid parties,· and on June 21, 
1948 Judge Hogenson denied the motion of each party ( Rec. 
64). 
The evidence shows, as is reflected by the abstract of 
title, plaintiff's Exhibit "A", that neither Bowers Investment 
Company, which company held the fee simple title in 1928, 
or V. Lynn J:Iansen to whom Bowers Investment Company 
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conveyed the property in 1937, nor Frank B. Bowers and· 
Winnifred S. Bowers, his wife or either of them, paid taxes 
on said property, either general or special, subsequent to the 
year 1928 and for in excess of 17 years, all after title passed 
from Bowers Investment Company to V. Lynn Hansen. It 
i~ further evident that these taxes accrued to a substantial 
amount of money, this without even computing interest there-
on over this period of in excess of 17 years. 
Defendants and respondents also rely in addition to the 
statutes of limitations upon the testimony of witness V. Lynn 
Hansen in order to defeat plaintiff's and appellant's title 
( Tr. 64) . However not one of the instruments of record as 
shown in the chain of title reflect anything but the fact that 
the title to the property passed from Bowers Investment 
Company to V. Lynn Hansen by deed without restrictions or 
conditions attached thereto and said deed bears a docu-
mentary internal revenue stamp. Neither is there a 
word of evidence, either documentary or oral, showing 
that appellant was informed of the fact that the deed which 
conveyed title to V. Lynn Hansen from Bowers Investment 
Company., was a mortgage only or that it was given and 
taken as security. Neither did Hansen in any one of his 
conversations during negotiations leading up to the delivery 
by Hansen of the deed to appellant, advise appellant of 
such fact. Appellant relied upon the county records when 
he paid the consideration and took his deed from Hansen 
(Tr. 39). 
At the conclusion of the evidence, the court ruled that 
title to the property was at the time of trial still in Bowers 
Investment Company, that it had never passed out of that 
corporation and that the deed given by that company to V. 
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Lynn Hansen was only for security (Tr. 57 and 60). The 
trial court further granted judgment in the matter of ap-
pellant vs Frank B. Bowers and Winnifred S. Bowers, his 
wife, for no cause of action (Tr. 60). 
The trial court also granted judgment in favor of respon-
dents on the tax title shown by respondents (Tr. 68) and 
awarded respondents a money judgment against appellant in 
the sum of $125.00 being the amount of rental received by 
appellant from the property during the period appellant had 
a used car dealer in possession of the property as his tenant 
(Tr. 69). Judgment was also granted to resondents for the 
possession of the property (Tr. 69) the trial judge giving as 
his reason for finding in favor of respondents, that appellants' 
action was barred by the four year statute of limitations 
(Tr. 71). 
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II. 
SPECIFICATION OF ERRORS 
Comes now the above-named appellant, and says that 
there is manifest error in the records, proceedings, and 
judgment entered in this cause in this, to-wit: 
l. The court erred in denying appellant's motion for 
judgment on the pleadings ( Rec. 64), for the reason that 
respondents' defense and counterclaim is barred by the 
statute of limitations as pleaded in appellant's reply. 
2. The court erred in admitting evidence on behalf of 
defendants Frank B. Bowers and Winnifred S. Bowers, his 
wife, which evidence was adopted by respondents as their 
evidence, which evidence was timely objected to by appellant, 
as follows: answer to question: (V. Lynn Hansen called by 
defendants Bowers as witness) Q Did Mr. Bowers give you 
anything as security for the payment of that indebtedness 
(Tr. 19), for the reason that respondents by said examination 
put in issue the fact that the deed given by Bowers lnv. Co. 
to Hansen was in fact a mortgage and not a deed, without 
having pleaded such fact. 
3. The court erred in admitting evidence on behalf of 
defendants Frank B. Bowers and Winnifred S. Bowers, his 
wife, which evidence was adopted by respondents as their 
evidence, which evidence was timely objected to by appellant, 
as follows: answer to question: (V. Lynn Hansen called by 
defendants Bowers as witness) Q Now that you have ex-
amined that, I will ask you if that is the paper which Mr. 
Bowers gave you as security for the indebtedness (Tr. 19), 
for the reason that respondents by said examination put 
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in issue the fact that the deed given by Bowers Investment 
Co. to Hansen was in fact a mortgage and not a deed, without 
having pleaded such fact. 
4. The court erred in admitting all of the testimony of 
witness Hansen regarding the transaction between Hansen 
and Bowers (Tr. 19 to 21 inclusive) which was timely ob-
jected to for the reason that respondents by said examination 
put in issue the fact that the deed given by Bowers Investment 
Co. to Hansen was in fact a mortgage and not a deed, with-
out having pleaded such fact. 
5. The court erred in sustaining respondents' objection 
to appellant's request for leave to amend his reply to 
respondents' answer and counterclaim by adding to para-
graph 9 thereof, the following: "The defendants are estopped 
from claiming title or reimbursement because of laches", 
(Tr. 34 and 35) for the reason that estoppel was a good 
defense to defendant's counterclaim, which defense must 
be specially pleaded; appellant was entitled to the benefit 
of the doctrine. 
6. The court erred in admitting evidence introduced 
on behalf of defendants Bowers which was adopted by respon-
dents over a timely objection by" appellant, as follows t answer 
to question: Q Mr. Pender, how much did you pay Mr. 
Hansen for that? (Tr. 39) for the reason that consideration 
is expressed in the deed which was in evidence and it is 
presumed that is was a fair consideration, failure or in-
sufficiency of consideration not having been put in issue 
by the pleadings. 
7. The court erred in its conclusions as expressed as 
follows: "I think Mr. Pender has no title. I am not too 
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certain that the defendant Frank Bowers has. It strikes 
me that the title is in the Bowers Investment Company, that 
they never gave the title away. They retained the title. The 
only thing they ever gave was a security, and then Frank 
Bowers tried to convert this security into a deed back to him-
~e If, and he would get nothing out of it, and the title 
ha~ been, is now, and always was in the Bowers Investment 
Company, subject only to such rights as Mr. Hansen may 
have." (Tr. 57) for the reason that Bowers Investment 
Company was not a party to the action. There is no evidence 
on which the court could so find and for the further reason 
that the title as between Bowers Inv. Co. and Hansen was not 
In Issue. 
8. The court erred in its finding that the statute of 
limitations barred appellants action (Tr. 71) for the reason 
that such finding is not supported by the evidence, in that 
there was no competent evidence to the effect that appellant's 
action was barred. 
9. The court erred in its refusal to adopt the Findings 
of Fact and Conclusions of Law proposed and submitted by 
appellant, for the reason that said findings of fact and 
conclusions of law as proposed are in accordance with the 
evidence. 
10. The court erred in making and entering its findings 
of fact to that portion of finding number 2, as follows: "for 
the purpose of securing an obligation of the Bowers Invest-
ment Company to the said Hansen", for the reason that there 
was no competent evidence to support or warrant said find-
ing, in that there was no issue raised by the pleadings as 
to any obligation existing between Bowers Investment Com-
pany and Hansen. 
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11; The court erred in making and entering its findings 
of fact number 3, for the reason that such finding is not 
supported by the evidence, in that there was no competent 
evidence to the effect that any obligation existed between 
Bowers Investment Co. and Hansen at the time the deed 
was delivered by Bowers Investment Co. to Hansen. 
12. The court erred in making and entering its finding 
of fact to that portion of finding number 12, as follows: 
"That plaintiff knew that V. Lynn Hansen and Milia Hansen 
were not the owners of the land described in finding No. 
1 ; and that plantiff was not a bona fide purchaser for 
value," for the reason that there was no competent evidence 
to support or warrant said finding, in that there was no 
issue raised by the pleadings as to lack or failure of con-
sideration, and such finding is against the evidence. 
13. The court erred in adopting respondent's conclusions 
of law. 
14. The court erred in overruling the motion of appellant 
for a new trial, as shown on page 97 of the transcript. 
15. The court erred in rendering judgment in favor of 
the respondents and against the appellant, as shown on pages 
94-95 of transcript. 
16. The court erred in its denial of judgment in favor of 
appellant and against respondent. 
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III. 
POINTS ARGUED BY APPELLANT 
The foregoing specifications of error, will be argued 
under the following propositions or points: 
1. Appellant was entitled to have his motion for judg-
ment on the pleadings granted. The statute of limitations 
was no bar to appellant's action but was a bar to respondent's 
defense and counter-claim. 
2. The court abused its discretionary power in refusing 
to permit appellant to amend his complaint at the commence-
ment of the trial of said cause Ior the purpose of pleading 
estoppel because of laches. 
3. Respondents can not rely upon the evidence introduced 
by defendants Frank B. Bowers and wife which is the evi-
dence upon which the court rendered its judgment. 
4. Respondents failed to establish their title on which 
judgment quieting title in them and awarding them posses-
sion of the property could be entered. 
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IV. 
ARGUMENT 
Point l. 
APPELLANT WAS ENTITLED TO HAVE HIS MO-
TION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS GRANTED. 
THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS WAS NO BAR TO 
APPELLANT'S ACTION BUT WAS A BAR TO RES-
PONDENTS' DEFENSE AND COUNTER-CLAIM. 
This is an equity action, a suit to quiet title and to re-
cover possession of real property, together with the rents, 
issues and profits therefrom. Appellant filed the usual short 
form pleading alleging that he was the owner of the property 
and in possession thereof and that defendants, R. L. Bird and 
Mae C. Bird, his wife, Frank B. Bowers and Winnifred S. 
Bowers, his wife, and all other persons unknown claiming 
any right, title, etc. which follows the statute as to unknown 
defendants, claimed some interest or title in and to the pro-
perty, and prayed for judgment declaring appellant to be 
the owner in fee simple of the property and adjudging the 
defendants to have no estate or interest in said property. 
Defendants and respondents Birds, answered appellant's 
complaint denying title in appellant and claiming title in 
themselves and alleging as one of the bases of their title 
an auditor's deed issued to these defendants which deed is 
based on a sale for delinquent taxes for the year 1928 on 
which the Auditor's deed issued Mar. 13th, 1936. Res-
pondents further plead Sees. 104-2-5 and 104-2-5.10 UCA 
1943, as added b'y Chapters 18 and 19, Laws of Utah, 
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19-13 as amended and Sec. 104-2-6 UCA, 19,1,3 as amended 
by Laws of Utah, 1943, Chapter 20 as a bar to plaintiff's 
action. 
Appellant filed his reply to defendants Blrd's answer 
and counter-claim denying the allegations contained in the 
counter-claim and pleaded Sees. 104-2-5, 104-2-6 and 
104-2-12, UCA 1943, and Sec. 104-2-5.10 Laws of Utah, 
1947 a~ a bar to these defendants' and respondents' counter-
claim. 
Defendants Frank B. Bowers and Winnifred S. Bowers, 
his wife, answered appellant's complaint denying title in 
plaintiff and appellant and alleged that these defendants 
are the owners of said property, all of which are but gen-
eral allegations. 
By his complaint, which is his third amended complaint, 
plaintiff and appellant further alleged that he did, on the 9th 
day of May, 1947 file an action to quiet title in him and 
against defendants Birds which affected the property described 
in plaintiff's complaint, which action was dismissed as to 
defendants Birds without having been tried on its merits. 
Which allegation was admitted by defendants Birds. 
Defendants and respondents Birds filed their motion for 
judgment on the pleadings as did plaintiff and respondent. 
This court has held that motions for judgment on the 
pleadings are not proper when applied for by a defendant to 
the action and when filed it is treated as a general demurrer. 
See Coburn v. Bartholomew, 50 Utah, 566 in which this 
court in treating of such a motion said at page 570: 
"Such a motion is not usual on the part of a defendant 
unless it be where a defendant's counterclaim is either 
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admitted or not denied, in which case his relation to 
to the question is that of a plaintiff. A motion for judg-
ment on the pleadings is essentially a proceeding on the 
part of a plaintiff. 23 Cyc. 769." 
In the instant case appellant denied the allegations con-
tained in respondents' counterclaim. 
This case is that type of action which our legislature con-
templated that Sees. 104-2-5, 104-2-5.10 and 104-2-6 UCA 
1943 as amended and the new section 104-2-5.10 Laws of 
Utah, 1947 would apply to, respondents' counterclaim not hav-
ing been filed within either four years from the date of sale 
of the property ( 1928) or within four years from the date of 
the issuance of auditor's deed (Mar. 13, 1936). This fact 
is evid~nced by the allegations contained in paragraph 8 of 
defendants' Birds' affirmative defense which reflects the 
fact that the tax sale bears date, December 21st, 1928 and 
the auditor's deed bears date March 13th, 1936. 
That part of Section 104-2-5.10 Laws of Utah, 1947 which 
applies is as follows: 
. . . "no counterclaim for the recovery of such property 
or for the possession thereof shall be interposed 
unless the same be brought or interposed within four 
years from the date of such sale or within four years 
from the date of the issuance of such auditor's deed." 
From a reading of the above cited law it is evident that 
respondents were required to file action or to set up a counter-
claim to an action either on or before December 21st, 1932 
which is four years from the date of the sale of the property, 
or on or before March 13th, 1940, which is four years from 
the date of the issuance of auditor's deed, otherwise respon-
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dents are not saved from the effect of the above statute. Res-
pondent~ filed their answer and counterclaim on Feb. 4th, 
1948. 
The statutes apply differently and a distinction is made 
between those actions involving only the recovery or pos-
se5sion of land and those actions brought for the recovery 
of real property held by a defendant under a tax deed. 
As the instant case is one for the recovery of real property 
held by defendants under a tax deed, we may eliminate from 
consideration section 104-2-5, Laws of Utah, 1943 because 
that section brings the case at bar under the provisions of 
section 104-2-5.10, Laws of Utah, 1943, which is as follows: 
Limitations of Actions-Real Estate Sold to County Under 
Section 80-l 0-68-F our Years. 
"No action for the recovery of re_?.l property struck 
off and sold to the county, as provided by section 
80-10-68 (6), Utah Code Annotated 1943 or for the 
possession thereof shall be maintained and no defense or 
counterclaim to any action involving the recovery of 
property, or the defense of title to property, sold at 
such tax sale, or public or private sale, or for possession 
thereof shall be set up or maintained, unless the same be 
brought or set up within four years from date on which 
the sale was held. Provided, however, that an action 
may be maintained or defense set up within four years 
from the effective date of this act with respect to real 
property sold prior to said effective date." 
(The effective date of this act is May lith, 1943) 
As to appellant's action, his complaint was filed on 
May 9th 1947 which was within the four 'year period pro-
vided for by the above cited act. However respondents' ans-
wer, defense and counterclaim were not filed as hereinbefore 
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pointed out, until Feb. 4th, 1948, which was approximately 
nine months after the four year period of limitations. There-
fore appellant was saved by his timely filing of his action, 
while respondents were not within time, all because the prop-
erty was sold prior to the effective date of the act, auditor's 
deed having issued Mar. 13th, 1936 based on tax sale for taxes 
of the year 1928. 
As is herein pointed out, appellant is saved from the 
running of the statute, the act of 1943 and also as this section 
is amended by section 104-2-5.10, Laws of Utah, 1947, hav-
ing brought his action May 9, 1947 or two days before the 
effective date of the 1943 act (May II, 1943, plus 4 years, 
May 11, 1947). Therefore the first part of the 1943 act 
herein above quoted has no application as against the rights 
of appellant but applies only as against respondent. Said 
' act is a bar to respondents' defense and counterclaim inas-
much as respondents' defense and counterclaim were neither 
one filed within the four year period. 
For the same reason, respondents' counterclaim and de-
fense are also barred by section 104-2-6 Laws of Utah, 1943, 
which is as follows: 
"104-2-6. Limitation of Actions-Real Estate-Seizen and 
Possession within Seven Years, Exception 
Property Held Under Tax Deed. 
"No cause of action, or defense or counterclaim to an 
action, founded upon the title to real property or to 
rents or profits out of the same, shall be effectual, 
unless it appears that the person prosecuting the action, 
or interposing the defense or counterclaim, or under 
whose title the action is prosecuted or defense or counter-
claim is made, or the ancestor, predecessor or grantor 
of such person was seised or possessed of the property 
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in question within seven years before the comm1ttmg 
of the act in respect to which such action is prosecuted 
or defense or counterclaim made; pr01?ided, however, 
that with respect to actions involving real property held 
under tax deed, the action must be brought or defense 
or counterclaim interposed within the time prescribed by 
section 104-2-5.10 of this code." 
The above section invokes the provisions of section 104-2-5.10 
in those actions where the property is held under tax deed. 
Section 104-2-6 above cited applying to possession of 
property in all cases excepting where the property is held 
under tax deed brings up the question of possession, not 
as the same affects the rights of appellant, but as the rights 
of respondents are effected. Appellant pleaded that he and 
his predecessors in interest were in possession of the property 
for in excess of 20 years. Respondents' right of possession 
was questioned at all times from the date they received their 
deed, on Sept. 5th, 1945. Respondents claimed no pos-
session or right to possession prior to Sept. 5th, 1945, there-
fore they could not rely and did not rely upon the seven 
year statute. 
Respondents cannot claim possession through any prede-
cessor in interest based on their tax title as has been held by 
this court in the case of Bozievich v Slechta, found in 166 
P2d at page 239, this because the County never at any time 
had a tenant in possession of the property during the period 
which the county held tax title to the property. 
In the Bozievich case at page 241 the court said: 
"Issuance of an auditor's tax deed did not give the 
county possession. It was the act of placing tenants 
in actual possession which initiated possession by the 
county." 
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There is no evidence in this record showing that the 
county had a tenant in possession of the property at any 
time. 
Appellant established by the evidence the fact that fee 
title to the property vested in him which carries with it the 
presumption that appellant was entitled to possession and was 
in actual possession as was held by this court in the case of 
Gibson v. McGurrin et al. 37 U. 158 in which the court 
said: 
"One who claims the title to property and brings an 
action to quiet title, under Comp. Laws 1907 Sec. 
3511, providing that an action may be brought by any 
person against another who claims an estate or interest 
in real property, adverse to him, to determine such 
adverse claim, need not prove that he is in possession, 
or entitled thereto, but it is sufficient if he establishes 
that the legal title is in him, and that defend~nts have 
no right, title, or interest adverse to him in the premises. 
On proof by plaintiff in an acion to quiet title, that 
the legal title is in him, the law presumes that he was 
in constructive possession; and, in the absence of evi-
dence to the contrary, it will be presumed that he was 
entitled to the actual possession of the land in con-
troversy, and proof that the legal title is in plaintiff is 
sufficient to support a finding that he is entitled to 
possession." 
Now it appears that the purpose of all of the statutes of 
limitations as herein referred to and as pleaded by both 
appellant and respondents is to compel fee owners who lose 
their property through tax sales to take action within four 
years from the date of sale to the county and also require the 
tax title purchaser to bring his action within a period of four 
years. That is to say, the purpose of the enactment by the 
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legislature appears to be to put the titles at rest by freezing 
conditions as they exist after a period of four years and 
while this might appear to place a tremendous premium on 
possession to the land, still it appears to be reasonable that 
unless a person pursues his remedy within a period of four 
years he shall be considered to have abandoned it. 
With the evidence as pleaded by the respective parties 
before the court, appellant's motion for judgment on the 
pleading should have been granted. 
Point 2. 
THE COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETIONARY POW-
ER IN REFUSING TO PERMIT APPELLANT TO AMEND 
HIS COMPLAINT AT THE COMMENCEMENT OF THE 
TRIAL OF SAID CAUSE FOR THE PURPOSE OF 
PLEADING ESTOPPEL BECAUSE OF LACHES. 
Appellant requested leave to amend his complaint at 
the commencement of the trial of the case on motion, which 
motion was denied by the trial court. The amendment pro-
posed by appellant would not have injected into the case a 
new or different cause of action, neither was the amendment 
as proposed such that it would have taken additional time 
for respondents to gather evidence to rebut or deny the allega-
tion as proposed. It was not an amendment which would 
be supported by evidence but was founded solely upon a 
legal principal, and would have permitted a complete ad-
judication of the matter in controversy; it would have been 
in furtherance of justice to have permitted the amendment. 
As it was, it was an obstruction of justice to have denied the 
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amendment. Appellant was prejudiced by the ruling of the 
court. 
This court has repeatedly held that amendments to 
pleadings, particularly if made prior to the trial of the cause 
should be granted with liberality, in fact this court has 
consistently encouraged all proper amendments to pleadings 
to the end of having a full hearing on the merits of the 
entire controversy. 
See Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v Clegg, (Utah) 
135 P2d 919. 
Hancock v Luke, 46 Utah 26, 148 P. 452, 
Harman v Yeager, 100 Utah 30, 110 P2d 352 
In the Hartford Accident Case this Court quoted from the 
New York case of Harriss v Tams, 258 N.Y. 229, 242, 179 
N. E. 476, as follows: 
"The power to permit amendments is denied only if a 
change is made in the liability sought to be enforced 
against the defendant." 
The amendment should have been allowed and appellant 
should have been permitted to urge his proposed estoppel. 
Point 3. 
RESPONDENTS CANNOT RELY UPON THE EVI-
DENCE INTRODUCED BY DEFENDANTS FRANK B. 
BOWERS AND WIFE WHICH IS THE EVIDENCE 
UPON WHICH THE COURT RENDERED ITS DECISION. 
Respondents adopted as their evidence, the testimony 
introduced over the objection of appellant, of V. Lynn Han-
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sen, a witness called to testify on behalf of defendants Frank 
B. Bowers and his wife. 
Witness Hansen was permitted to testify over the objec-
tion of appellant to the fact that the deed given to him by 
Bowers Investment Company, the owner of the fee simple title 
in 1928 was given and received by him as security for 
monies owed to him and not for the purpose of conveying 
title. Appellant made timely objection to this evidence and 
gave as his reasons for the objection the fact that appellant 
was taken by surprise, that the evidence injected into the case 
a new issue which appellant was not prepared to meet. There 
was not one word contained in the pleadings of the fact 
that the deed given by Bowers Investment Company to Han-
sen was given as security only. As has been pointed out 
heretofore, Bowers Investment Company was not even a 
party to the action, neither was Bowers lnv~stment Company 
represented at the tri~l of the case. Counsel for Frank B. 
Bowers urged the fact that the deed shown in the chain of 
title from Hansen to Frank B. Bowers had the effect of 
a reconveyance of the property originally conveyed by 
Bowers Investment Company, the corporation, the original 
grantor and owner, to Hansen. Such a contention is 
absolutely rediculous, but even so, it apparently influenced 
the trial court's decision. Hansen testified to the fact 
that in 1937 he was a paint contractor employed as a 
painter for Bowers Investment Company and Frank B. Bow-
ers (Tr. 18) and because Mr. Bowers, (not Bowers Invest-
ment Company) was indebted to Hansen at that time, Mr. 
Bowers gave Hansen the deed to the property, (Tr. 18 and 
19). 
Now Mr. Hansen could not testify with certainty even 
with the help of his counsel to the fact that the deed which 
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the court received in evidence was in fact the deed given to 
him by Mr. Bowers as security for the indebtedness, (Tr. 20). 
There is no question from the testimony of witness Han-
sen of the fact that if there was an indebtedness, it was Frank 
B. Bowers and not the corporation who was indebted to 
him ( Tr. 20) . If however, the court is of the opinion that 
there was an indebtedness owing by the corporation to Han-
sen at the time the deed was given, then witness Hansen 
admitted that at the time he received the deed he satisfied the 
obligation at least in part ( Tr. 25). Witness Hansen also 
testified to the fact that at the time he delivered the deed to 
Frank B. Bowers he was sure he received consideration for 
the deed, that money passed between them, which testimony 
is as follows as found on page 28 of the transcript: 
Q Now at the time you gave a deed back to Frank B. 
Bowers of this same property, do you recall that transaction 
Mr. Hansen? 
A I don't recall it very clearly. xxx I certainly don't 
remember the specific time. I am sure I did it. 
Q Do you remember what consideration took place 
between you? 
A. No sir. 
Q Do you recall whether any money passed from Mr. 
Bowers to you at that time? 
A Well I am sure that it did. 
Q. You are sure that it did. Your negotiations at 
that time were with Frank B. Bowers, were they? 
A Yes. 
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No explanation was made or even attempted to be 
made to show why the deed which was given by V. Lynn 
Hansen to Frank B. Bowers was not recorded for over 10 
years (Tr. 20). Frank B. Bowers did not explain why he 
failed to pay taxes on the property during all those years, 
and during which time Frank B. Bowers held the deed un-
recorded. Not until after the recording of the deed from 
V. Lynn Hansen to appellant did Frank B. Bowers record his 
deed. 
It is contended and we think the evidence clearly shows 
that the property, being at the time situated near the business 
section of town and having been assessed with general and 
special assessments which accrued to a substantial sum, so 
much so that neither Bowers lnv. Co., V. Lynn Hansen, or 
Frank B. Bowers were willing to pay these taxes, that the 
property was abandoned and after so many years it is pos-
sible that Hansen forgot that he held title to the property. 
Hansen of course wanted to disclaim any interest in the 
property. He did not want to assume and pay all of the 
taxes which were assessed against the property. This court 
will, we think, take judicial notice of the fact that a stranger 
to a title is in a much more favored position when he takes 
property over after it has been sold for general and special 
taxes, than is the owner of the fee title. The stranger may 
redeem or buy in the property for a small percentage of the 
amount of taxes owing whereas the owner of the fee title 
cannot do so, therefore Hansen was not interested in the 
property, being obliged to pay the delinquent assess-
ments. Not until the values of property generally increased 
was anyone interested in this property. 
Respondents contended at the trial of the case that the 
consideration paid by appellant was unconscionable and was 
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not valuable consideration for the deed but the evidence as 
shown by the testimony of appellant is to the effect that 
when appellant negotiated with Hansen for the purchase of 
the property, appellant was informed of the fact that the 
property had been sold for taxes and that special assess-
ments had been levied in a substantial sum against the 
property. 
The court found that appellant was put on notice of the 
fact that Hansen held title to the property as security and 
that the appellant was not a bona fide purchaser of the 
property for value, hut there is no evidence in the record to 
support such a finding. Not one word of evidence. Appel-
lant testified to the fact, which is undisputed, that he relied 
upon the county records in negotiating with Hansen for the 
deed to the property, that he found title to the property in 
Hansen and so informed Hansen, and that the property was 
subject to unpaid general and special taxes since the year 
1928. Hansen did not advise appellant at any one of his 
conferences of the fact that he held the property as security 
only and that the deed held by him was in fact a mortgage; 
the record is wholly lacking of such evidence. Hansen did 
not testify to the fact that he so advised appellant. 
The testimony of Mr. Hansen as to his meeting with 
appellant as found on page 23 of the transcript is to the 
effect that Mr. Pender called on Hansen and asked for a quit 
claim deed. Mr. Hansen called his attorney. Hansen told 
appellant that he (Hansen) did not own the property. There 
were several contacts had between appellant and Hansen 
and Hansen did not accept the first offer made by appellant 
(Tr. 28). Appellant testified to the fact that there was 
nothing said at any one of the conversations had with 
Hansen to the effect that Hansen did not own the property 
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but that all negotiations and conversations were regarding 
the price to be paid by appellant. (Tr. 39). This was not 
denied by Hansen. 
While Respondents contend that the consideration paid 
by appellant to Hansen for the quit claim deed is uncon~ 
scionable and it is evident that respondents convinced the 
trial court of this fact, still respondents do not consider it 
unconscionable for them to take the property which they 
endeavored to prove has such great value, upon payment 
by respondents of the sum of $350 for the county tax deed 
and the sum of $910.00 for the city deed. Attention is 
invited to the fact that not only did the city deed cover the 
property affected by these proceedings but it covered other 
properties also. This court will, we think, take judicial 
notice of the fact that before appellant can acquire good 
title to the property free and clear of tax liens, appellant 
must redeem and pay off these taxes. Such has been the law 
as laid down by this court in equity actions in numerous 
cases some of which cases are those of Utah Lead Co. v 
Piute County, 65 P2d 1199 in which this court said: 
"The title to parcel No. 2 be quieted in plaintiff 
subject to his paying to Young all legitimate taxes 
assessed against said property paid by him, together 
with costs and penalties paid by the latter with interest 
on such payments to time of consummation of decree." 
and in Burton v Hoover (Utah) 74 P2d 652 in which case the 
court said: 
"For the reason stated, the judgment in favor of 
defendant is reversed, but as the plaintiff has invoked 
the aid of a court of equity to vacate the tax deeds, he 
must do equity, and at least to the extent to which the 
attempted purchase by defendant has relieved his prop-
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erty of liens, he must as a condition to obtaining such 
relief, reimburse the defendants, together with interest 
on such amount at the legal rate from the date of pay-
ment until repaid." 
in the Burton case the court cited the cases of Oregon Short 
LineR. Co. v Hallock 41 U 378, 126 P. 394. 
Holland v Hotchkiss, 162 Cal. 366, 123 P. 258, L.R.A. 
1915 c., 492 
and the Utah Lead case herein above cited. 
Because of the law as laid down by this honorable court 
and because of the fact that as appellant testified, appellant 
was aware of the fact that there were unpaid and delinquent 
general and special assessments against the property, it is 
evident that appellant will be required to pay a larger con-
sideration for the property in order to clear his title than 
would respondents, therefore respondents argument is un-
sound. There is no evidence supporting the courts finding that 
because Hansen conveyed for a nominal consideration appel-
lant was put upon notice. We ask, who complains about 
this unconscionable price paid by appellant? No one other 
than the tax title purchasers. 
It was contended by respondents that appellant was 
further put upon notice of the fact that Hansen had no title 
because Hansen conveyed by quit claim deed and therefore 
appellant was not a bona fide purchaser for value. The trial 
court in its finding No. 12 found that plaintiff knew that V. 
Lynn Hansen and Milia Hansen were not the owners of the 
land described in finding No. 1; (which is the property 
affected by the action) and that plaintiff was not a bona 
fide purchaser for value. For the court to so find robs the 
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recording act of its virtues as is said by Pomeroy in his 
Equity Jurisprudence Vol. 2, at Sec. 754 in which we find 
the following: 
"The taking of a quit claim deed does not negative 
presumption of good faith," (footnote) 
and Sec. 754 is as follows: 
"Some of the ablest text writers and jurists of this 
country hold to the view that a grantor cannot by any 
form of deed do more than convey all his right, title 
and interest; that a quit-claim will convey a perfect 
fee-simple title, just as effectually as a warranty deed, 
if in fact the grantor at the time of executing the deed 
has such a title; that a quit claim deed no more im-
plies that the grantor doubts the goodness of his title 
than a warranty deed implies that the grantor con-
siders the title unsafe without the support of covenants 
and assurances involving personal liability for dam-
ages; and that a purchaser who relies upon the public 
records showing a clear title in the grantor, even though 
he takes a. quitclaim deed, cannot be denied the char-
acter of a bona fide purchaser without robbing the re-
cording acts of their virtue." 
This view has received the sanction of the United States 
Courts. 
As has heretofore been pointed out, the property affected 
by this action was at all times vacant, it was not under 
cultivation, it was not enclosed by a fence, there was nothing 
of a physical nature which ~ould suggest ownership in anyone 
other than the record owner. 
The trial court's having held that appellant had notice 
of the fact that Hansen did not own the property is wholly con-
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trary to the evidence. Even the deed by which Hansen 
acquired title from Bowers Investment Company contained 
a documentary internal revenue stamp importing considera-
tion. This contradicts the fact that no consideration was 
paid by Hansen and of course it was admitted that considera-
tion was paid by Hansen in satisfying an obligation existing 
between him and Bowers. 
The fact that the deed from Bowers Investment Co. to 
Hansen recited only a nominal consideration did not charge 
appellant with notice of the fact that Hansen had no interest 
in the property. Such is the law of this state as is given by 
Sec. 78-l-6 Laws of Utah, 1945 which is as follows: 
78-l-6 Acknowledgment-Recording-Notice. 
"Every conveyance of real estate, and every instru-
ment of writing setting forth an agreement to convey 
any real estate or whereby any real esta!e may be 
affected, to operate as notice to third persons shall he 
proved or acknowledged and certified in the manner 
prescribed by this title and recorded in the office of 
the recorder of the county in which such real estate is 
situated, hut shall be valid and binding between the 
parties thereto without such proofs, acknowledgment, 
certification or record, and as to all other persons who 
have had actual notice. Neither the fact that an instru-
ment, recorded as herein provided, recites only a nomi-
nal consideration, nor the fact that the grantee in such 
instrument is designated as trustee, or that the convey-
ance otherwise purports to he in trust without naming 
the beneficiaries or stating the terms of the trust shall 
operate to charge any third person with notice of the 
interest of any person or persons not named in such 
instrument." 
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If the facts of this case were as contended by respond-
ents and as found by the court, why did not Bowers Invest-
ment Company, by its officers, or V. Lynn Hansen intervene 
in the case and protect their interest, if any either had? 
Neither appeared on their own behalf but total strangers to 
the t.itle come into court and attempt to set aside convey-
ances for their own gain, and this as against a bona fide 
purchaser of the fee title for value. It is clearly evident that 
Frank B. Bowers claimed nothing in the premises and that if 
he ever at any time claimed an interest that he abandoned that 
interest in his not having recorded his deed received from 
Hansen for in excess of 10 years, and in permitting the 
property to go to tax sale for both general and special taxes 
for so many years. That he now files his disclaimer is 
evident of this fact. 
NOTICE AS AFFECTING PRIORITY 
As to the matter of whether from the evidence intro-
duced in this case, appellant was put upon notice of fact as 
contended, that Hansen had no title which he could con-
vey to appellant. Even if it were competent which we do not 
concede and provided it had been properly pleaded in order 
to make it competent, there are not sufficient facts proven to 
support such a fiinding. We find the following law and 
authorities on this subject in support of this contention, to-wit: 
Thompson on Real Property, Vol. 8, Sec. 4506--Rea-
sonable diligence in inquiry, says: 
"Only reasonable diligence in acquiring knowl-
edge is required and this is held satisfied by the exam-
ination of the public records unless he has notice of 
defects not disclosed by the records. {with numerous 
cases cited)". 
and Thompson says further in this same section: 
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"It has been said that mere want of caution on 
the part of the purchaser in making inquiry, as distin-
guished from fraudulent or wi~lful blindness, is not 
sufficient to chaa'ge him with constructive notice." 
There is no evidence in this case to the effect that appel-
lant had notice of defects not disclosed by the records. Ap-
pellant did make inquiry of the record owner and the fact 
that Hansen said he did not own the property which is denied 
was not sufficient to put appellant on notice of fact that some-
one else owned the property when Hansen dict:t inform ap-
pellant. Many people will say they do not own property when 
it has gone to tax deed over a period of many years and 
especially may one such as appellant whom the evidence 
shows has dealt in many tax title properties, assume that one 
does not claim ownership of property after it has gone to tax 
-sale. This is the usual position of fee owners. They consider 
their property lost as a result of tax sales. 
In 109 ALR at page 746 we find the law as follows on 
the question of notice: 
"It is well established that vague or general rum-
ors, reports, surmises, covert insinuations, or general 
assertions, based on hearsay and made by strangers or 
those not interested in the property, as· to the existence 
of a title or interest in some third person or persons 
whose title or interest is not recorded, do not constitute 
notice of title or interest in such third person, or im-
pose upon a purchaser or mortgagee the duty of in-
. " quzry. 
The fact that Hansen said he did not own the property did not 
impose the duty of further inquiry on appellant when he 
knew the record title was in Hansen. 
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The annotation above quoted also goes on at page 7 49 
and says: 
''A general report that there is an outstanding 
claim or conveyance without defining what sort of 
claim or to whom is not notice to the purchaser." 
In the case of Hall v Livingston found in the above 
annotation it being a case where a purchaser was told prior 
to the purchase that it was understood the property was 
charged with a trust, and the purchaser was not thereby 
charged with notice, the court said; 
"The notice, to affect him, must be more than 
would excite the suspicion of a cautious and wary pur-
chaser. It must have been so clear and undoubted, with 
respect to the existence of the prior tight, as to make 
it fraudulent in him, afterwards, to take and hold the 
property." 
and in Raymond v Flavel (Oregon), also found in the above 
annotation, which is a case closely in point with the instant 
case, it was held that a statement made to a prospective 
purchaser, warning him against buying the land because 
of the possibility of future trouble with persons claiming 
an outstanding equity in the property, who afterwards 
brought the action, was insufficient to affect his rights as a 
bona fide purchaser, because the testimony, taken in its 
strongest light, gave no suggestion of any fact of a tan-
gible nature bearing any indication whatever of the exist-
ence of a secret trust in the property. 
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PLEADING-ISSUE RAISED BY ANSWER SETTING 
UP GENERAL DENIAL ONLY 
Defendants Bowers attempted to prove equitable title in 
them as did respondents Birds, for the purpose of defeating 
plaintiff's title. Neither respondents Birds or defendants 
Bowers pleaded facts sufficient to permit evidence on this 
issue. Respondents' answer and counterclaim contains no 
allegation on this matter and Defendants Bowers' answer 
simply denjes title in plaintiff and alleges that they are 
the owners of the property. Counsel for Bowers contended 
that such general denial and allegation of ownership under 
affirmative defense put in issue the title to the property by 
virtue of which evidence of the fact that the deed given by 
Bowers Investment Company to Hansen was in fact not a 
deed but a mortgage and that the deed was taken as security 
for an indebtedness. 
Section 104-9-l UCA 1943 under pleadings (Answer) 
provides: 
"The answer of the defendant must contain: 
(I ) General and special denial of each material 
allegation, etc. 
( 2) A statement of any new matter constituting a 
defense or counterclaim." 
and in 49 Corpus Juris, Sec. 223, at page 194. Equitable 
Defenses, we find the law stated as follows: 
"The general rule is that to be available, an equitable 
defense must be pleaded, and must contain sufficient 
averments to satisfy all the requirements of a good bill 
in equity. It must state facts sufficient to constitute 
a defense." 
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In 51 Corpus Juris at page 234--Equitable title we find 
the law stated as follows: 
··Generally, defendant to avail himself of an equitable 
title as against plaintiff's legal title, should specifically 
plead it. ·An answer setting up an equitable interest 
under a contract should allege the fairness of the con-
tract and the adequacy of the consideration." 
and at the same page under the subject Adverse Claim, it is 
said: 
'·It has been held that, in statutory proceedings to 
determine adverse claims, defendant, relying on an 
adverse claim in himself, must plead the nature of his 
claim, although the nature of his claim need not be set 
forth at length where this has already been done in the 
complaint." 
The court should not have permitted any evidence to 
come into the record under the state of the pleadings to the 
effect that Hansen took title to the property as security only 
or that the deed was in fact a mortgage and not intended 
to convey title to the property. 
Point 4. 
RESPONDENTS FAILED TO ESTABLISH THEIR 
TITLE ON WHICH JUDGMENT QUIETING TITLE IN 
THEM AND AWARDING THEM POSSESSION OF THE 
PROPERTY COULD BE ENTERED. 
We contend that defendants and respondents had no 
meritorious defense and established no right to any judicial 
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relief. Appellant conclusively established title in him. Res-
pondents had the burden of going forward with evidence 
to present a valid defense or some right to affirmative relief 
under their counterclaim. See Gatrell v Salt Lake County, 
106 Utah 409, 149 P.2d 827. Respondents offered no 
evidence in support of their answer and counterclaim except 
to show payment of taxes. 
It was admitted by respondents at the trial of the case 
that one of the auditor's affidavits was omitted from the 
assessment rolls for the year for which the property was 
sold to the county for delinquent general taxes. Therefore 
respondents acquired nothing but a lien on the property for 
the payment of taxes as has been the rule of this court re-
peatedly. This title failing, the only other color of title 
which respondents had upon which to rely was that acquired 
from the city. The abstract of title shows certificates of 
sales for special assessments at entries No. 1 and No. 2 for 
sidewalk assessments, and at entry No. 4 a certificate 
of sale for paving assessments on which sales Recorder's 
Deeds issued from the Treasurer to Salt Lake City, a munici-
pal corporation, and on Feb. 26, 1946 Salt Lake City convey-
ed by Quit Claim Deed, the property affected by this action, 
together with other properties, to respondents. Respondents 
introduced no evidence as to the regularity of the proceedings 
leading up to the sale of said property to Salt Lake City 
for the special assessments. Counsel for respondents asked 
counsel for appellant if he would stipulate as to the regular-
ity of such proceedings which counsel for appellant refused 
to do. (Tr. 11, 12, and 13). 
The evidence shows that respondents, instead of taking 
an assignment of the Certificate of sale for special taxes 
from the city, redeemed the special taxes (See abstracter's 
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certificate) and thus extinguished the lien of the special taxes, 
and therefore it is our contention that the lien of the special 
taxes having been extinguished, even if respondents had 
proved by the evidence the regularity of the proceedings 
leading up to the sale of the property for special taxes, 
which they failed to do, respondents acquired nothing by the 
quit claim deed from Salt Lake City. 
We have no statute which makes a special tax proceed-
ing prima facie evidence of the regularity of the proceeding 
leading up to the sale of the property such as we have under 
sales for general taxes. 
This court has held that the failure of any one of the 
prerequisties of a valid sale is as fatal to the sale as the 
failure of all thereof. See Olsen v Bagley, 10 Utah 492, 
Eastman v Gurry, 15 U. 410 and Crystal Car Line vs State 
Tax Com. (Utah) 174 P2d 995. 
It is our further contention that the lien f~r special 
taxes is extinguished and this court has so held in the 
cases of Petterson v Ogden City and Western Beverage Co. 
v Hansen in each of which cases it was said that where after 
a lien for special improvements had accrued there was levied 
a general tax against such property which was sold to satisfy 
the latter tax, the sale for general taxes extinguished the muni-
cipal lien for special improvement taxes. 
It is evident that the lien for special improvements had 
accrued in the instant case prior to 1928; the certificate of 
sale bears date Apr. 20, 1928. The Tax Sale for general 
taxes bears date of Dec. 21, 1928. Therefore the property 
was sold to satisfy the tax of 1928 and the sale thus made 
extinguished the lien for special improvement taxes, therefore 
respondents' special tax title could be of no force or effect. 
Attention is invited to the fact that appellant's action 
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was filed prior to the effective date of the 194 7 act making 
general and special tax liens equal. 
In line with the decisions of this court, because appellant 
has invoked the aid of a court of equity to vacate the tax 
deeds, he is willing to do equity, but in so doing appellant 
should be required to pay only the amount found necessary 
to relieve the property of the lien of the general tax, being 
the sum of $350.00 together with interest on said amount 
from the 5th day of September, 1945, the day on which the 
deed issued from Salt Lake County, to respondents together 
with taxes subsequently assessed and paid by respondents 
less rental value of the property. We think our position 
as herein expressed finds support in the following decisions 
of this court, to-wit: 
Burton v Hoover, (Utah) 74P2d 652. 
Tree v White, (Utah) 171 P2d 398. 
Peterson v Weber County, (Utah) 103 P2d 652 
and particularly the cases of Petterson v Ogden City 176 
P2d 599, 
and Western Beverage Co. vs Hansen, 
98 Utah 332, 96 P2d 1105. 
Wherefore appellant prays that the judgment and decree 
entered herein he vacated and that appellant have judgment 
quieting title against respondents upon paying to respondents 
such sum or sums as may be found to be equitable, and 
for an order requiring respondents to surrender possession 
of the premises to appellant and for an accounting of rents 
for the period of time during which respondents have had 
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the use of said property which sum shall be credited to the 
taxes found to be owing by appellant to respondents; also for 
costs including costs on this appeal. 
Respectfully submitted, 
MILTON V. BACKMAN, 
of BACKMAN & BACKMAN, 
Attorneys for Plaintiff and Appellant. 
Received copies of the foregoing Brief of Ap,pellant this 
--- day of May, 1949. 
Attorneys for Defendants and ~espondents 
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